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This work introduces a concept of explanations with respect to the violation of safe behaviours within
software defined networks (SDNs) expressible in NetKAT. The latter is a network programming
language that is based on a well-studied mathematical structure, namely, Kleene Algebra with Tests
(KAT). Amongst others, the mathematical foundation of NetKAT gave rise to a sound and complete
equational theory. In our setting, a safe behaviour is characterised by a NetKAT policy which does not
enable forwarding packets from ingress to an undesirable egress. Explanations for safety violations
are derived in an equational fashion, based on a modification of the existing NetKAT axiomatisation.
1 Introduction
Explaining systems failure has been a topic of interest for many years now. Techniques such as Fault
tree analysis (FTA) and Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) [5], for instance, have been proposed
and widely used by reliability engineers in order to understand how systems can fail, and for debugging
purposes.
In the philosophy of science there is a considerable amount of research on counterfactual causal
reasoning which, ultimately, can be exploited in explaining system failures as well. A notion of causality
that is frequently used in relation to technical systems relies on counterfactual reasoning. The results
in [21] formulate the counterfactual argument, which defines when an event is considered a cause for
some effect (or hazardous situation) in the following way: a) whenever the event presumed to be a cause
occurs, the effect occurs as well, and b) when the presumed cause does not occur, the effect will not
occur either. Nevertheless, this formulation of causality is considered too simple for explaining complex
logical relationships leading to undesired situations. Consequently, the work in [15] introduces a notion
of complex logical events based on boolean equation systems and proposes a number of conditions under
which an event can be considered causal for an effect.
The seminal work in [15] has been adopted in various settings. Closely related to the explanation
of failures based on adoptions of [15] are the results in [3, 20, 7], for instance. All these works adjust
the definition of causality in [15] to the setting of system executions leading to a failure. The approach
in [3] considers one such execution at a time, and uses counterfactual causal reasoning for identifying
the points in the trace that are relevant for the failure. The results in [20, 7], on the other hand, aim
at discovering the causal explanations for all failures in a system, and strongly rely on model-checking
based techniques [2].
In this paper we focus on explaining violations of safe behaviours in software defined networks
(SDNs). Software defined networking is an emerging approach to network programming in a setting
where the network control is decoupled from the forwarding functions. This makes the network control
directly programable, and more flexible to change. SDN proposes open standards such as the Open-
Flow [22] API defining, for instance, low-level languages for handling switch configurations. Typically,
∗This work was supported by the DFG project “CRENKAT”, proj. no. 398056821.
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this kind of hardware-oriented APIs are not intuitive to use in the development of programs for SDN plat-
forms. Hence, a suite of network programming languages raising the level of abstraction of programs,
and corresponding verification tools have been recently proposed [10, 26, 27]. It is a known fact that for-
mal foundations can play an important role in guiding the development of programming languages and
associated verification tools, in accordance with an intended semantics obeying essential (behavioural)
laws. Correspondingly, the current paper is targeting NetKAT [1, 11] –a formal framework for specifying
and reasoning about networks, integrated within the Frenetic suite of network management tools [10].
More precisely, we will exploit the sound and complete axiomatisation of NetKAT in [1] in order to
derive explanations of safety failures in a purely equational fashion. It is well known that equational
reasoning could alleviate the state explosion issue characteristic to model-checking, by equating terms
equivalent modulo associativity, commutativity and indepotnecy, for instance.
Related to the current work, the results in [24] introduce a framework for automated failure local-
isation in NetKAT. The approach in [24] relies on the generation of test cases based on the network
specification, further used to monitor the network traffic accordingly and localise faults whenever tests
are not satisfied. In contrast, our approach falls under the umbrella of equivalence checking, and it
provides an explanation for all possible failures, irrespective of particular input packets.
Our contributions. In this paper we introduce a concept of safety in NetKAT which, in short, refers to
the impossibility of packets to travel from a given ingress to a specified hazardous egress. Then, we
propose a notion of safety failure explanation which, intuitively, represents the set of finite paths within
the network, leading to the hazardous egress. Eventually, we provide a modified version of the original
axiomatisation of NetKAT exploited in order to automatically compute the safety failure explanations,
if any. The axiomatisation employs a proposed star-elimination construction which enables the sound
extraction of explanations from Kleene ∗-free NetKAT programs.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2 we provide an overview of NetKAT and the associated sound and
complete axiomatisation. In Section 3 we define the concept of safety in NetKAT. In Section 4 we
introduce the notion of safety failure explanation and the axiomatisation which can be exploited in order
to compute such explanations. In Section 5 we draw the conclusions and pointers to future work.
2 Preliminaries
As pointed out in [1], a network can be interpreted as an automaton that forwards packets from one node
to another along the links in its topology. This lead to the idea of using regular expressions –the language
of finite automata–, for expressing networks. A path is encoded as a concatenation of processing steps
(p.q. . . .), a set of paths is encoded as a union of paths (p+q+ . . .) whereas iterated processing is encoded
using Kleene ∗. This paves the way to reasoning about properties of networks using Kleene Algebra with
Tests (KAT) [19]. KAT incorporates both Kleene Algebra [18] for reasoning about network structure and
Boolean Algebra for reasoning about the predicates that define switch behaviour.
NetKAT packets pk are encoded as sets of fields fi and associated values vi as in Figure 1. Histo-
ries are defined as lists of packets, and are exploited in order to define the semantics of NetKAT poli-
cies/programs as in Figure 2. NetKAT policies are recursively defined as: predicates, field modifications
f ← n, union of policies p+q (+ plays the role of a multi-casting like operator), sequencing of policies
p.q, repeated application of policies p∗ (the Kleene ∗) and duplication dup (that saves the current packet
at the beginning of the history list). Predicates, on the other hand, can be seen as filters. The constant
predicate 0 drops all the packets, whereas its counterpart predicate 1 retains all the packets. The test
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Figure 1: NetKAT syntax [1]
Figure 2: NetKAT semantics [1]
predicate f = n drops all the packets whose field f is not assigned value n. Moreover, ¬a stands for the
negation of predicate a, a+b represents the disjunction of predicates a and b, whereas a.b denotes their
conjunction.
Let H be the set of all histories, andP(H) be the powerset of H. In Figure 2, the semantic definition
of a NetKAT policy p is given as a function JpK that takes a history h ∈ H and produces a (possibly
empty) set of histories inP(H). Some intuition on the semantics of policies was already provided in the
paragraph above. In addition, note that negated predicates drop the packets not satisfying that predicate:J¬aKh = {h} \ JaKh. The sequential composition of policies Jp.qK denotes the Kleisli composition • of
the functions JpK and JqK defined as:
( f •g)x,
⋃
{gy | y ∈ f x}.
The repeated iteration of policies is interpreted as the union of F i h, where the semantics of each F i
coincides with the semantics of the policy resulted by concatenating p with itself for i times, for i ∈ N.
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p+(q+ r)≡ (p+q)+ r KA-PLUS-ASSOC a+(b.c)≡(a+b).(a+ c) BA-PLUS-DIST
p+q≡ q+ p KA-PLUS-COMM a+1≡1 BA-PLUS-ONE
p+0≡ p KA-PLUS-ZERO a+¬a≡1 BA-EXCL-MID
p+ p≡ p KA-PLUS-IDEM a.b≡b.a BA-SEQ-COMM
p.(q.r)≡ (p.q).r KA-SEQ-ASSOC a.¬a≡0 BA-CONTRA
1.p≡ p KA-ONE-SEQ a.a≡a BA-SEQ-IDEM
p.1≡ p KA-SEQ-ONE
p.(q+ r)≡ p.q+ p.r KA-SEQ-DIST-L
(p+q).r ≡ p.r+q.r KA-SEQ-DIST-R
0.p≡ 0 KA-ZERO-SEQ
p.0≡ 0 KA-ZERO-SEQ
1+ p.p∗ ≡ p∗ KA-UNROLL-L
1+ p∗.p≡ p∗ KA-UNROLL-R
q+ p.r ≤ r⇒ p∗.q≤ r KA-LFP-L
p+q.r ≤ q⇒ p.r∗ ≤ q KA-LFP-R
Figure 3: Kleene Algebra Axioms & Boolean Algebra Axioms [1]
f ← n. f ′← n′≡ f ′← n′. f ← n, if f 6= f ′ PA-MOD-MOD-COMM
f ← n. f ′ = n′≡ f ′← n′. f = n, if f 6= f ′ PA-MOD-FILTER-COMM
dup. f = n≡ f = n.dup PA-DUP-FILTER-COMM
f ← n. f = n≡ f ← n PA-MOD-FILTER
f = n. f ← n≡ f = n PA-FILTER-MOD
f ← n. f ← n′≡ f ← n′ PA-MOD-MOD
f = n. f = n′≡0, if n 6= n′ PA-CONTRA
Σi f = i≡1 PA-MATCH-ALL
Figure 4: Packet Algebra Axioms [1]
In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we recall the sound and complete axiomatisation of NetKAT. The Kleene
Algebra with Tests axioms in Figure 3, have been formerly introduced in [19]. Completeness of NetKAT
results from the packet algebra axioms in Figure 4. The axiom PA-MOD-MOD-COMM stands for the
commutativity of different field assignments, whereas PA-MOD-FILTER-COMM denotes the commu-
tativity of different field assignments and tests, for instance. PA-MOD-MOD states that two subsequent
modifications of the same field can be reduced to capture the last modification only. The axiom PA-
CONTRA states that the same field of a packet cannot have two different values, etc.
We write ` e ≡ e′, or simply e ≡ e′, whenever the equation e ≡ e′ can be proven according to the
NetKAT axiomatisation.
Assume, for an example, a simple network consisting four hosts H1,H2,H3 and H4 communicating
with each other via two switches A and B, via the uniquely-labeled ports 1,2, . . . ,6, as illustrated in
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Figure 5: A simple network
Figure 5. The network topology can be given by the NetKAT expression:
t , pt = 5.pt← 6+pt = 6.pt← 5+
pt = 1+pt = 2+pt = 3+pt = 4
(1)
For an intuition, in (1), the expression pt = 5.pt← 6+pt = 6.pt← 5 encodes the internal link 5−6 by
using the sequential composition of a filter that keeps the packets at one end of the link and a modification
that updates the pt fields to the location at the other end of the link. A link at the perimeter of the network
is encoded as a filter that returns the packets located at the ingress port.
Furthermore, assume a programmer P1 as in [1] which has to encode a switch policy that only enables
transferring packets from H1 to H2. P1 might define the “hop-by-hop” policy in (2), where each summand
stands for the forwarding policy on switch A and B, respectively.
p1 , pt = 1.pt← 5+pt = 6.pt← 2 (2)
In the expression above, the NetKAT expression pt = 1.pt← 5 sends the packets arriving at port 1 on
switch A, to port 5, whereas pt = 6.pt← 2 sends the packets at port 6 on switch B, to port 2.
At this point, from P1’s perspective, the end-to-end behaviour of the network is defined as:
(pt = 1).(p1.t)∗.(pt = 2) (3)
In words: packets situated at ingress port 1 (encoded as pt = 1) are forwarded to egress port 2 (encoded
as pt = 2) according to the switch policy p1 and topology t (encoded as (p1.t)∗).
More generally, assuming a switch policy p, topology t, ingress in and egress out, the end-to-end
behaviour of a network is defined as:
in.(p.t)∗.out (4)
Hence, based on (3), in order to asses the correctness of P1’s program, one has to show that:
1. packets at port 1 reach port 2, i.e.,
` (pt = 1).(p1.t)∗.(pt = 2) 6≡ 0 (5)
2. no packets at port 1 can reach ports 3 or 4, i.e.,
` (pt = 1).(p1.t)∗.(pt = 3+pt = 4)≡ 0. (6)
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By applying the NetKAT axiomatisation, the inequality in (5) can be equivalently rewritten as:
` pt = 1.pt← 2+ e 6≡ 0 (7)
with e a NetKAT expression. Observe that pt = 1.pt← 2 cannot be reduced further. Hence, the inequality
in (5) holds, as pt = 1.pt← 2 6≡ 0. In other words, the packets located at port 1 reach port 2. Showing
that no packets at port 1 can reach port 3 or 4 follows in a similar fashion.
3 Safety in NetKAT
As discussed in the previous section, arguing on equivalence of NetKAT programs can be easily per-
formed in an equational fashion. One interesting way of further exploiting the NetKAT framework is
to formalise and reason about well-known notions of program correctness such as safety, for instance.
Intuitively, a safety property states that “something bad never happens”. Ideally, the framework would
provide a positive answer whenever a certain safety property is satisfied by the program, and an explana-
tion of what went wrong in case the property is violated.
Consider the example of programmer P1. The “bad” thing that could happen is that his switch policy
enabled packets to reach ports 3 or 4. One can encode such a hazard via the egress policy out, pt = 3+
pt = 4, and the whole safety requirement as in (6). As previously discussed, the NetKAT axiomatisation
provides a positive answer with respect to the satisfiability of the safety requirement in (6).
We further proceed by formalising a notion of port-based hop-by-hop policy and a safety concept in
NetKAT. Let f1, . . . , fn be the list of fields defining a packet, including the port field pt. Moreover, for
simplicity, and without loss of generality, assume no two different ports have the same value/identifier
in the network. Let←−Apt represent the set of all possible port assignments pt← v for some value v. Let
T denote the set of all possible tests of the form f = v for some field f ∈ { f1, . . . , fn} and value v. We
write:
• T ∗ to represent the set of all sequences of tests in T
• Σ
T
∗ for the set of all tests t = Σi={i,...,m}t
∗
i with t
∗
i ∈ T
∗
, for all i ∈ {1, . . .m}
Definition 1 (HbH Switch Policy). A switch policy p is called port-based hop-by-hop (HbH) if it is
defined as:
p, Σi∈{1,...,m} t
∗
i .
←−pt i (8)
where t
∗
i ∈ T
∗
and←−pt i ∈←−Apt, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
We call m the size of the HbH policy p.
Definition 2 (In-Out Safe). Assume a network topology t, a HbH switch policy p, an ingress policy
in ∈ Σ
T
∗ , and an egress policy out ∈ Σ
T
∗ , the latter encoding the hazard, or the “bad thing”. The end-to-
end network behaviour is in-out safe whenever the following holds:
` in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ 0. (9)
Intuitively, none of the packages at ingress in can reach the “hazardous” egress out whenever for-
warded according to the switch policy p, across the topology t.
Remark 1. A notion of reachability within NetKAT-definable networks was proposed in [1] based on the
existence of a non-empty packet history that, in essence, records all the packet modifications produced
by the policy in.(p.t)∗.out. This is more like a model-checking-based technique that enables identifying
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one counterexample witnessing the violation of the property in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ 0. As we shall later see, in
our setting, we are interested in identifying all (loop-free) counterexamples. Hence, we propose a notion
of in-out safe behaviour for which, whenever violated, we can provide all relevant bad behaviours.
Going back to the example in Section 2, assume a new programmer P2 which has to enable traffic
only from H3 to H4. Assuming the network in Figure 5, P2 encodes the HbH switch policy:
p2 , pt = 3.pt← 5+pt = 6.pt← 4 (10)
The end-to-end behaviour can be proven correct, by showing that:
1. packets at port 3 reach port 4, i.e.,
` (pt = 3).(p2.t)∗.(pt = 4) 6≡ 0 (11)
2. no packets at port 3 can reach ports 1 or 2, i.e.,
` (pt = 3).(p2.t)∗.(pt = 1+pt = 2)≡ 0. (12)
Nevertheless, it is easy to show that the composed policies p1 in (2) and p2 in (10) do not guarantee
a safe behaviour. Namely, in the context of the HbH policy p1 + p2, packets at port 1 can reach ports 3
or 4, and packets at port 3 can reach ports 1 or 2. This violates the correctness properties in (6) and (12),
respectively:
` (pt = 1).((p1 + p2).t)∗.(pt = 3+pt = 4) 6≡ 0 (13)
` (pt = 3).((p1 + p2).t)∗.(pt = 1+pt = 2) 6≡ 0 (14)
In the next section, we would like to provide the explanation for the failure of the network safety, as
expressed in (13) and (14).
4 Explaining Safety Failures
Naturally, the first attempt to explain safety failures is to derive the counterexamples according to the
NetKAT axiomatisation. Take, for instance, the end-to-end behaviour (pt = 1).((p1 + p2).t)∗.(pt = 3+
pt = 4) in (13). The axiomatisation leads to the following equivalence:
(pt = 1).((p1 + p2).t)∗.(pt = 3+pt = 4)≡ (pt = 1.pt← 4)+ e (15)
where e is a NetKAT expression containing the Kleene ∗. A counterexample can be immediately spotted,
namely: pt = 1.pt← 4. Nevertheless, the information it provides is not intuitive enough to serve as an
explanation of the failure. Moreover, e can hide additional counterexamples revealed after a certain
number of ∗-unfoldings according to KA-UNROLL-R/L in Figure 4.
In what follows, the focus is on the following two questions:
Q1: Can we reveal more information within the counterexamples witnessing safety failures?
Q2: Can we reveal all the counterexamples hidden within NetKAT expressions containing ∗?
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The answer to Q1 is relatively simple: yes, we can reveal more information on how the packets travel
across the topology by inhibiting the PA-MOD-MOD and PA-FILTER-MOD axioms in Figure 4. Recall
that, intuitively, this axiom records only the last modification from a series of modifications of the same
field.
The answer to Q2 lies behind the following two observations. (1) From a practical perspective, in
order to explain failures it suffices to look at loop-free forwarding paths within the network topology.
Reaching the same port twice along a path does not add insightful information about the reason behind
the violation of a safety property, as the network behaviour is preserved in the context of that port.
Considering loop-free paths is also in accordance with the minimality criterion invoked in the seminal
work on causal reasoning in [15], for instance. (2) A HbH switch policy p of size n entails loop-free
paths from in to out crossing at most n switches within a topology t. Hence, in order to determine all
loop-free paths from in to out it suffices to apply the HbH policy p along t for n times. Showing that the
suggested approximation is sound reduces to showing:
` in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ 0 iff ` in.(1+ p.t)n.out ≡ 0 (16)
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are needed in order to prove the equivalence in (16).
Lemma 1. Let p, t be two NetKAT policies. The following holds, for all natural numbers n:
(1+ p.t)n ≡ 1+ p.t +(p.t)2 + . . .+(p.t)n (17)
Proof. The proof follows by induction on n.
Base case: n = 0. If n = 0 then (1+(p.t))0 = 1, inferred based on the definition of Kleisli composition.
Induction step: Assume (17) holds for all k such that 0≤ k ≤ n. It follows that:
(1+ p.t)n+1 ≡ (1+ p.t)n.(1+ p.t) (Kleisli composition)
≡ (1+ p.t +(p.t)2 + . . .+(p.t)n).(1+ p.t) (ind. hypothesis)
≡ 1+ p.t +(p.t)2 + . . .+(p.t)n+
p.t +(p.t)2 + . . .+(p.t)n +(p.t)n+1 (KA-SEQ-DIST-L/R, KA-ONE-SEQ)
≡ 1+ p.t +(p.t)2 + . . .+(p.t)n +(p.t)n+1 (KA-PLUS-IDEM)
Hence, (17) holds.
Lemma 2. Let p, t, in, out be NetKAT policies. The following holds, for all natural numbers n:
in.(1+ p.t)n.out ≤ in.(p.t)∗.out (18)
Proof. First, observe that
in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ in.(1+ p.t +(p.t)2 + . . .+(p.t)n +(p.t)n+1.(p.t)∗).out (19)
by KA-UNROLL-L/R, KA-PLUS-IDEM and KA-SEQ-DIST-L/R. Consequently, by Lemma 1, the fol-
lowing also holds:
in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ in.(1+ p.t)n.out+ in.(p.t)n+1.(p.t)∗.out (20)
Therefore,
in.(1+ p.t)n.out ≤ in.(p.t)∗.out
holds as well.
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Theorem 1. (Star Elimination for Safety) Assume a network topology t, a HbH switch policy p of size n,
an ingress policy in ∈ Σ
T
∗ , and an egress policy out ∈ Σ
T
∗ encoding the hazard. The following holds:
` in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ 0 iff ` in.(1+ p.t)n.out ≡ 0 (21)
Proof. The “if” case follows immediately, as by Lemma 2 and the hypothesis the following holds:
0≤ in.(1+ p.t)n.out ≤ in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ 0.
For the “only if” case we proceed by reductio ad absurdum.
Assume:
in.(p.t)∗.out 6≡ 0. (22)
By the hypothesis, the definition of Kleene ∗ and the assumption in (22), it follows that there exists N > n
such that:
in.(p.t)N .out 6≡ 0.
Consider:
p , Σi∈{1,...,n} t
∗
i .pt← vi
t , Σ j∈{1,...,m}pt = v j .pt← v′j
(23)
and assume N = n+ k. Given the shape of the HbH switch policy p and topology t, it follows that there
exist policies e1 6≡ 0, e2 such that:
` in.(p.t)N .out ≡ e1 + e2
with e1 , in.pN .out and
pN , (t
∗
i1 .pt← vi1 .pt = vi1 .pt← v′j1). . . . .(t
∗
in+k .pt← vin+k .pt = vin+k .pt← v′jn+k) (24)
where t
∗
il ,vil ,v
′
jl range over t
∗
i ,vi,v
′
j as in (23).
Note that e1 denotes a path that goes through N > n switches from in to out. Recall that the switch
policy p can define loop-free paths traversing at most n switches (the size of p). Hence, we conclude that
the identified path is not loop-free, i.e.:
e1 , in.
(t
∗
i1 .pt← vi1 .pt = vi1 .pt← v′j1).
. . .
(t
∗
iα .pt = viα .pt← v′iα ).
. . .
(t
∗
iα+β .pt = viα .pt← v′iα+β ).
. . .
(t
∗
in+k .pt← vin+k .pt = vin+k .pt← v′jn+k).
out
(25)
with β ≥ k. Based on e1, we can devise a policy defining a loop-free path that crosses at most n switches
from in to out. Consider a policy pN↓ that stands for pN without the loop of size β from (25):
pN↓ , t∗i1 .pt← vi1 .pt = vi1 .pt← v′j1 .
. . .
t
∗
iα . pt = viα .pt← v′iα .
t
∗
iα+β . pt = viα+β+1 .pt← v′iα+β+1 .
. . .
t
∗
in+k .pt← vin+k .pt = vin+k .pt← v′jn+k .
(26)
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By the construction of pN↓ and the fact that e1 6≡ 0 it follows that:
in.pN↓ .out 6≡ 0. (27)
In words, we identified a path that traverses the topology from in to out and crosses at most n switches.
Moreover, by the hypothesis and Lemma 1, the following hold:
in.out ≡ 0
in.(p.t)i.out ≡ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. (28)
Hence, (27) contradicts (28). We conclude that the “only if” case holds as well.
With these ingredients at hand, in accordance with Q1 and Q2, consider an alteration of the axiomati-
sation as follows. Firstly, we inhibit the axioms PA-MOD-MOD, PA-FILTER-MOD and KA-UNROLL-
R/L. Then, we add the star elimination axiom corresponding to (21) in Theorem 1:
in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ in.(1+ p.t)n.out. (29)
Let `s be the entailment relation over the modified axiomatisation.
Definition 3 (Safety Failure Explanations). Assume a network topology t, a HbH switch policy p of
size n, an ingress policy in ∈ Σ
T
∗ , and an egress policy out ∈ Σ
T
∗ encoding the hazard. A safety failure
explanation is a policy expl 6≡ 0 in canonical form (i.e., it cannot be reduced further) such that:
`s in.(p.t)∗.out ≡ expl. (30)
For an example, we refer to the case of the two programmers providing switch policies p1 and p2
forwarding packets from host H1 to H2, and from H3 to H4 within the network in Figure 5. As previously
discussed, the end-to-end network behaviour defined over each of the aforementioned policies can be
proven correct using the NetKAT axiomatisation. Nevertheless, a comprehensive explanation of what
caused the erroneous behaviour over the unified policy p1 + p2 could not be derived according `. The
new axiomatisation, however, entails the following explanation:
`s (pt = 1).((p1 + p2).t)∗.(pt = 3+pt = 4)≡ pt = 1.pt← 5.pt← 6.pt← 4
showing how packets at port 1 can reach port 4. Similarly,
`s (pt = 3).((p1 + p2).t)∗.(pt = 1+pt = 2)≡ pt = 3.pt← 5.pt← 6.pt← 2
shows how packets at port 3 can reach port 2.
Remark 2. The work in [1] proposes a “star elimination” method for switch policies not containing dup
and switch assignments. The procedure in [1] employs a notion of normal form to which each NetKAT
policy can be reduced. The reason for not using the aforementioned star elimination in our context is
that the normal forms in [1] “forget” the intermediate sequences of assignments and tests, and reduce
policies to sums of expressions of shape ( f1 = v1. . . . . fn = vn).( f1 ← v′1. . . . . fn ← v′n) where f1, . . . , fn
are the packet fields. Hence, the normal forms exploited by the star elimination in [1] can not serve as
comprehensive failure explanations.
Remark 3. Note that the safety failure explanations in Definition 3 are not minimal. There might be
cases in which two explanation paths
e1 , p′.p′′ e2 , p′.p˜.p′′
are identified. Nevertheless, minimality in this context is easy to achieve in a post-processing step that
pattern-matches expressions like e1 and e2 and keeps only e1 as relevant explanation.
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5 Discussion
In this paper we formulate a notion of safety in the context of NetKAT programs [1] and provide an
equational framework that computes all relevant explanations witnessing a bad, or an unsafe behaviour,
whenever the case. The proposed equational framework is a slight modification of the sound and com-
plete axiomatisation of NetKAT, and is parametric on the size of the considered hop-by-hop switch
policy. Our approach is orthogonal to related works which rely on model-checking algorithms for com-
puting all counterexamples witnessing the violation of a certain property, such as [20, 6], for instance. A
corresponding tool for automatically computing the explanations can be straightforwardly implemented
in a programming language like Maude [8], for instance; we leave this exercise as future work. We
consider assessing the complexity of the procedure for real case scenarios, on top of benchmarks as
in [16, 17], for instance.
The results in this paper are part of a larger project on (counterfactual) causal reasoning on NetKAT.
In [21], Lewis formulates the counterfactual argument, which defines when an event is considered a
cause for some effect (or hazardous situation) in the following way: a) whenever the event presumed to
be a cause occurs, the effect occurs as well, and b) when the presumed cause does not occur, the effect
will not occur either. The current result corresponds to item a) in Lewis’ definition, as it describes the
events that have to happen in order for the hazardous situation to happen as well. The next natural step
is to capture the counterfactual test in b). This reduces to tracing back the explanations to the level of the
switch policy, and rewrite the latter so that it disables the generation the paths leading to the undesired
egress. The generation of a “correct” switch policy can be seen as an instance of program repair.
In the future we would be, of course, interested in defining notions of causality (and associated
algorithms) with respect to the violation of other relevant properties such as liveness, for instance. We
would also like to explain and eventually disable routing loops (i.e., endlessly looping between A and
B) from occurring. Or, we would like to identify the cause of packets being not correctly filtered by a
certain policy.
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